The Reference Book, by John Hawthorne and David Manley by Salis, Fiora
The Reference Book, by John Hawthorne and David Manley. Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press 2012, 280 pages. ISBN 9780199693672
John Hawthorne and David Manley wrote an excellent book on the 
many issues surrounding the twin notions of reference and singular 
thought. The book is divided into two parts corresponding to two 
main objectives. In Part I, which is titled “Against Acquaintance” and 
includes Chapters 1-3, they present a first case in favour of what they 
call liberalism — the view according to which neither reference nor 
singular thought are constrained by a special relation of acquaintance 
— and they consider and reject various arguments against it. In Part 
II, which is titled “Beyond Acquaintance” and includes Chapters 4-6, 
they challenge the current semantic rift between definite descrip-
tions, indefinite descriptions, demonstratives and names. The hy-
pothesis they defend is that specific indefinites, definite descriptions 
and demonstratives make the same contribution to truth-conditions 
while they differ in their presuppositional profile. Names, on the 
other hand, should be treated somewhat differently but their pre-
dicative uses and their referential uses would be strictly related. In 
the “Afterword” at the end of the book the authors recapitulate the 
main line of argument and expose some doubts on the very notion of 
reference and on the existence of linguistic expressions from natural 
language that are really referential.
Chapter 1 offers an introductory critical review of the central 
notions of reference, singular thought and acquaintance as they have 
been characterised in the contemporary debate. The authors survey 
the themes that are standardly associated with the notion of refer-
ence, including object-dependence, exhaustiveness, rigidity and the 
similarities between the semantic behaviour of referential terms and 
that of variables whose meaning is fixed relative to an assignment 
function. They further introduce the existent characterizations of 
singular thought in terms of singular content, mental files, and re-
lational object-representations as opposed to satisfactional repre-
sentations. And they distinguish two main notions of acquaintance 
in terms of discriminating knowledge, which they call epistemic ac-
quaintance, and in terms of a causal relation to the object, which they 
call causal acquaintance. In section 1.6, titled “Should auld acquaint-
ance be forgot?”, Hawthorne and Manley present a series of examples 
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of apparent singular thought without acquaintance, some of which 
have been originally put forward by anti-acquaintance champions 
such as Robin Jeshion (e.g. ‘Ways of Taking a Meter’, Philosophical 
Studies 99, 2000, 297-318). Liberalism emerges as an appealing view.
Chapter 2 challenges the causal notion of acquaintance by focus-
ing on a principle the authors call CONSTRAINT: “To have a singular 
thought about an object, one must be acquainted with it” (37). They 
present and discharge two arguments in favour of this principle, i.e. 
what they call the spy argument and the Neptune argument. The spy ar-
gument, which deploys an example originally presented by David 
Kaplan (‘Quantifying In’, Synthese 19, 1968, 178-214), begins with 
the intuitive distinction between (1) and (2):
(1) Ralph believes that at least one person is a spy.
(2) There is one person whom Ralph believes to be a spy.
The explicit premise is that Ralph has only the general belief that 
there are spies, without suspecting anyone in particular. So, while 
(1) seems to be a correct report of Ralph’s belief, (2) does not. Haw-
thorne and Manley explain this difference by introducing two fur-
ther principles. The first, which they call HARMONY, says that: “Any 
belief report whose complement clause contains either a singular 
term or a variable bound from outside by an existential quantifier 
requires for its truth that the subject believe a singular proposition” 
(38). The second, which they call SUFFICIENCY, says that: “Believing 
a singular proposition about an object is sufficient for having a singu-
lar thought about it” (38). Acquaintance theorists can certainly ac-
cept both HARMONY and SUFFICIENCY, but they would explain 
the unacceptability of (2) by appealing to CONSTRAINT: since 
Ralph is not acquainted with any particular spy he could not believe 
of any specific person that she is a spy. But Hawthorne and Manley 
argue that CONSTRAINT is actually irrelevant. One only needs to 
observe that (2) attributes a singular belief to Ralph while the origi-
nal premise was that Ralph only has a general belief that there are 
spies, which is in fact correctly reported by (1). This solution is really 
straightforward.
The Neptune argument involves Kripke’s controversial notion of 
the contingent a priori. In the early 19th-century Urbain Le Verrier 
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postulated the existence of an unknown planet to explain the pertur-
bations in the orbit of Uranus using only mathematics and astronom-
ical observations. Kripke suggests that Le Verrier might have intro-
duced the name ‘Neptune’ through an act of descriptive stipulative 
reference fixing as the planet responsible for the observed perturbations in 
Uranus’ orbit. It follows that Le Verrier could know that (3) was true, 
(3) If a unique planet is the perturber, it is Neptune.
and on the assumption that ‘Neptune’ is a genuine name contrib-
uting its referent to the proposition expressed by (3), Le Verrier 
would thereby have a piece of singular knowledge. Hawthorne and 
Manley agree with most defendants of CONSTRAINT that this out-
come should be rejected, but again they do not believe that CON-
STRAINT has any role to play in an explanation of why the out-
come should be rejected. They consider four alternative replies to 
upholders of CONSTRAINT that they deem insufficient and then 
claim that even if CONSTRAINT was satisfied in some way (includ-
ing magic!) this would not eliminate the impression that Le Verrier 
should not be able to achieve some piece of contingent knowledge by 
linguistic stipulation. The discussion of this case (and of similar ones) 
is very rich and it even includes a section on the possible sources of 
confusion that might generate the notion of the contingent a priori. 
However, eventually the authors do not offer any explanation of why 
such a notion is puzzling. What they find puzzling is that the Nep-
tune case and those similar to it “involve epistemic advance due to a 
kind of semantic good fortune that might seem like it should be ir-
relevant to one’s stock of knowledge” (64). This is the criticism that 
upholders of CONSTRAINT make against theories that do not im-
pose any acquaintance constraint on reference and singular thought 
(see, e.g. Scott Soames, Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century, 
Vol. 2, Princeton 2003, 397-422). However, once we reject CON-
STRAINT, what would be really puzzling about the contingent a pri-
ori? Why could one not gain a new piece of knowledge by linguistic 
stipulation? The Neptune argument is not complete unless such an 
explanation is offered. And one might suspect that since knowledge 
of contingent truths typically involves some kind of empirical (and so 
possibly causal) relation to the world, some notion of acquaintance 
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will be needed to explain what is really puzzling about acquiring a 
priori knowledge of contingent truths.
Chapter 3 challenges the two paradigmatic versions of the epis-
temic notion of acquaintance according to which being acquainted 
with an object means possessing discriminating knowledge of it or 
knowing that the object exists. The first version has been originally 
put forward by Gareth Evans (The Varieties of Reference, Oxford: Ox-
ford University Press, 1982) and is inspired by Russell’s principle: 
“To have a singular thought about an object, one must know which 
object one is thinking about” (71). Hawthorne and Manley distin-
guish between the ordinary notion of discriminating knowledge and 
the theory-laden notion put forward by Evans. They focus on the 
latter and belabour on six reasons why one should be sceptical of it. 
They then move to discuss two versions of epistemic acquaintance as 
knowledge of existence and discharge them on the basis of consid-
erations about the safety-theoretic consequences of knowledge and 
the connection between understanding and knowledge. This chapter 
offers an excellent critical discussion of the options available to pro-
ponents of an epistemic acquaintance constraint on singular thought 
and of the specific reasons why one should reject it.
Chapter 4 analyses the linguistic phenomenon of specific indef-
inites. For example, someone might utter (4) to talk about a specific 
individual, say Maria, in a context in which some friends are present 
and some other friends are absent:
(4) A friend of mine is absent.
Intuitively, the truth of (4) depends only on whether Maria is present 
or absent. An even clearer case would involve the modifier ‘certain’ 
as when, say, David utters (5) about his daughter Mary:
(5) A certain person is unhappy.
Hawthorne and Manley belabour on three alternative analyses of 
specific indefinites. According to the bifurcated view, indefinite de-
scriptions are ambiguous between a quantifier interpretation and a 
referential interpretation corresponding to a non-specific use and to 
a specific use respectively. A non-specific use of an indefinite descrip-
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tion ‘an F’ contributes an existential phrase and the property F to the 
proposition expressed by a sentence containing it. A specific use of 
the same indefinite description contributes the individual the speak-
er intends to talk about, but if there is no individual satisfying the 
description then the indefinite will contribute nothing. According to 
the simple view, there is no difference in truth-conditional content be-
tween specific and non-specific uses of indefinites but different con-
tents can be conveyed through pragmatic mechanisms. According to 
the domain restriction view inspired by Roger Schwarzschild (‘Single-
ton Indefinites’, Journal of Semantics 19, 2002, 289-314), specific uses 
and non-specific uses of indefinites are given a quantificational analy-
sis but a specific use involves the semantic mechanisms of quantifier 
domain restriction. This is the option preferred by Hawthorne and 
Manley. A quantifier domain restrictor is a property determined by 
an overt noun, e.g. ‘person’ in (5), in combination with some covert 
material. The combination of the overt predicate and the covert ma-
terial is called the restrictor and the property they combine to express 
is called the restrictor property. The extension of the restrictor at a 
world is given by the intersection of the extension of the property 
expressed by the overt predicate and the property expressed by the 
implicit material. A restrictor with a singleton extension is called a 
singleton restrictor. Hawthorne and Manley claim that specific indef-
inites involve a specific class of covert quantifier domain restrictors 
that they call speciic restrictors. These can be non-rigid, i.e. they de-
termine a different individual at each different world, or they can be 
rigid, i.e. they determine the same individual at all possible worlds 
where that object exists. A non-rigid restrictor might contribute a 
qualitative property such as being David’s oldest daughter. A rigid re-
strictor might contribute a property such as being identical to Mary, 
which is the authors’ preferred solution, or a rigidified property such 
as being David’s actual oldest daughter, which the authors reject because 
it might generate the wrong truth conditions. In the latter case the 
speaker might intend to talk about a specific individual but the covert 
material would pick out somebody else entirely or, possibly, nobody. 
The authors further distinguish between candid restrictions, which are 
accessible to an audience, and coy restrictions, which are often pri-
vate and not immediately accessible to the audience. Specific indef-
inites usually involve coy restrictions.
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Hawthorne and Manley criticise the bifurcated view and the sim-
ple view on different grounds, but ultimately they do not give (and 
do not intend to give) any knock down argument against them. One 
problem that they mention for the domain restrictor view concerns 
the notion of understanding that they put forward. So, for example, 
since covert restrictors are part of the semantic content of (4) and (5) 
but they are not immediately accessible to the audience it remains to 
be explained how one can fully understand what they express. The 
explanation of understanding that they offer in section 4.8, which 
is titled “Acquaintance again”, is merely sketched, but it involves a 
modified version of Kripke’s notion of communication chain through 
which the referent of a name is transmitted from speaker to speaker. 
As they write: “It is indeed quite true that our ability to think and 
talk about a particular object often proceeds thanks to engagement 
with other members of a linguistic community who in turn have that 
ability thanks to further engagements of that sort, and so on; and 
where ultimately the chain of inheritance is anchored by some indi-
vidual who thinks and talks about an object via direct encounter with 
that object (or its traces).” (138). The authors modify Kripke’s origi-
nal proposal in claiming that this picture can work independently 
from whether we use a name or, say, a specific indefinite (which 
is certainly correct) and that it can be stated independently of the 
notion of acquaintance. The main problem of this explanation of un-
derstanding is that ultimately Hawthorne and Manley seem to fall 
back into deploying the notion of acquaintance when they appeal to 
the direct encounter with the object that is at the origin of the chain of 
reference transmission. A direct encounter is nothing less than the 
direct perception of an object, which is a paradigmatic case of causal 
acquaintance. Furthermore, according to Kripke’s original account, 
the transmission of this original causal relation to the object at the 
origin of the practice is what guarantees that speakers participate in 
the same communication chain, and hence that they think and talk 
about the same object. Hawthorne and Manley should articulate this 
idea in a way that does not (even implicitly) appeal to the notion of 
acquaintance, but unless they do this they cannot claim to have of-
fered an account of how we understand specific indefinites.
In Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 the authors extend their proposal 
to definite descriptions, demonstratives, nouns and proper names. 
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In particular, they suggest that while specific indefinites imply coy 
restrictors definite descriptions typically (although not always) imply 
candid restrictors. Developing on previous work done especially by 
Jeffrey King (Complex Demonstratives, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
2001), Hawthorne and Manley extend the domain restriction view 
to complex and simple demonstratives. In section 6.3, titled “Sali-
ence”, they argue that the use of a demonstrative is different from 
that of a definite description in that the former relies on supplemen-
tal salient information helping the audience in identifying the object. 
The authors focus on the view that proper names are predicates, and 
consider two further views, what they call the bifurcated view and 
the minimal view. According to the predicate view, a proper name 
contributes a property to truth-conditional content. According to 
the bifurcated view, it contributes a predicate to the presupposition 
set and an individual to truth-conditional content. According to the 
minimal view, the truth conditional contribution involves a covert 
existential and a singular restrictor. In the end the authors tend to 
reject the predicate view and favour the other two, although they do 
not decide on either. This last chapter is as rich in details as the oth-
ers, but its argumentation is mostly explorative and its conclusions 
are merely tentative.
The book is very well written, its style is engaging and the dis-
cussion extends to cover some of the most central issues surround-
ing the notion of reference and singular thought in an innovative 
and original way. The authors offer an excellent critical discussion 
of the options available to proponents of an acquaintance constraint 
on singular thought and reference and of the specific reasons why 
one should reject it. But some aspects of their original proposal are 
still open to further improvement and in the end one might suspect 
that the authors have not really emancipated themselves from even 
the weakest notion of causal acquaintance. The linguistic analysis of 
indefinites, definite descriptions, demonstratives and names is ex-
tremely rich and almost complete. On a conclusive remark though, 
one might wonder about the special case of non-referring names 
(such as fictional names, mythical names and names of false scien-
tific posits) and how they should be treated within this framework. 
Hawthorne and Manley’s account is still open to further interesting 
developments.
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